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Do voters prefer political candidates who express reluctance to seek office, or do
voters prefer candidates who express great ambition and an implicit hunger for power?
This study uses an experimental design to test overall support of reluctant or power-
hungry candidates, and discusses which people would select which candidate and why.
While limited by the survey design, the evidence suggests that there is no significant
overall mean difference for overall support of either candidate. However, personality
traits and the degree to which participants perceived certain descriptive attributes of the
candidates both play a role in vote likelihood and candidate favorability for each of the
two candidates. Most importantly, when participants perceived power hunger in a
candidate, that candidate was avoided, which supports previous research.
1Introduction
As demonstrated in an economic game experiment by Hibbing and Alford (2004),
people are “wary” to give authority to someone who seeks power, and are more willing to
give authority to someone who reluctantly accepts power given to them. In electoral
politics, does this same concept apply? If, for example, a Congressional candidate has
been nominated to run, and only seeks office out of a sense of public service and not a
need for power, would more voters support them than they would a more ambitious
Congressional candidate? The answer would be immediately relevant to those studying
voter behavior—could it be that people would support a candidate simply by virtue of the
fact that the candidate does not want to be supported? If so, is it not in the interest of
campaigns to bill their candidate as reluctant to accept authority? Which voters prefer
which candidate and why? This study seeks to address these questions.
This study employs an experimental design in which the key experimental
manipulation pertains to a mock Congressional election candidate’s level of expressed
ambition. Half of participants read about a candidate expressing reluctance to run for
office, and the other half of participants read about a candidate who expresses ambition
and thirst for power. The survey includes favorability and vote likelihood batteries for
each candidate, as well as a Big Five personality battery, issue attitudes, as well as the
strength of the participants’ political ideology and party identification.
2LITERATURE REVIEW
Wary Cooperator Theory
Political scientists have had a difficult time studying vote choice among the
general population. Many voters are ill-informed (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996) and the
wild instability of people’s political attitudes over time—as first studied by Campbell et
al. (1960) and Converse (1964)—are reflective of a task for academics and scholars of
vote choice that may serve to be impossible to solve. While some have put forth the idea
that “rational choice” helps to explain political behavior (e.g. Chubb & Moe, 1988), the
limits of human cognition and attention (see Downs, 1976; Simon, 1946) coupled with
the general weaknesses and flaws inherent in the rational choice framework (see Green &
Shapiro, 1996; Smith & Larimer, 2009, pp. 67-69) have led political behavior scholars to
seek other methods by which they could explain behavior at the ballot box, as well as
generalized political behavior.
In 2004, Hibbing and Alford used an economic game experiment to find that most
people are “wary” to surrender authority to someone who explicitly exhibits a thirst for
power, but are willing to give authority to someone who reluctantly accepts what is given
to them (Hibbing & Alford, 2004). The authors consider this to be a common trait held by
most people for evolutionary, biological reasons (p. 66n), as it is evolutionarily
advantageous for our species to be cautiously cooperative, and aware of the possibility
that we could be “screwed” out of resources of finite supply that we deserve (p. 74). In
incorporating these facets of evolutionary psychology, Hibbing and Alford devised this
framework of the “wary cooperator,” which, for the purposes of this essay, will hereafter
be referred to as “Wary Cooperator Theory,” or WCT (see also Alford & Hibbing, 2004).
3Before proceeding, it is important to more fully explain WCT’s origins within
evolutionary theory and natural selection. Aside from being the backbone of modern
biological science (Dobzhansky, 1973; Kutschera & Niklas, 2004), natural selection has
been easily applied across the social sciences, including political science (for a review,
see Hatemi & McDermott, 2011; Tingley, 2006). Theoretically, it would best serve
citizens’ survival to elect the person who seemed most willing to serve the citizens, as
opposed to electing someone that seems more willing to serve themselves.
The results of the economic game experiment by Hibbing and Alford were
replicated by Smith in 2006, who also used an economic game to find that the decisions
made by people who are power-hungry “are viewed with less legitimacy than those who
do not overtly seek positions of authority,” (Smith, 2006, p. 1019). This view was held by
such political theorists as Machiavelli and James Madison (Larimer, Hannagan & Smith,
2007, p. 57). So, although the idea is nothing new, WCT offers a new take on political
behavior and could help to explain an additional factor to which citizens may turn in
formulating their voice choice.
Reluctant Candidates in Politics
Little research has been done on WCT in general outside of those who have
explicitly employed it in economic games (Hibbing & Alford, 2004; Smith, 2006), and
none have employed the theory to simulate an election, even though many candidates for
political office throughout history have expressed reluctance to run for office in the first
place—although it must be noted that Hibbing and Alford (2004) specifically test for
participants’ attitudes toward decision-makers, and not necessarily public officials.
4Nevertheless, the attribute of reluctance has been common in political figures for
millenia. The Roman dictator Quintus Cincinnatus had to be convinced to “leave his
plow,” and assume the dictatorship (Grimshaw, 1826, p. 38). The early U. S. Senate, after
unanimously electing him, feared that the reluctant-to-be-a-politician George Washington
would not be willing to assume the presidency (Chernow, 2011).
Meanwhile, in recent American history, the trend continues. Like many other
office-seekers today, U. S. Senator Ron Johnson, Republican of Wisconsin, publicly
asserted his initial unwillingness and overall hesitation to seek the office (Stiles, 2010).
Governor Rick Perry, Republican of Texas, made his reluctance to seek the Republican
Party presidential nomination a part of his campaign stump speech, noting that it was his
wife—not the governor himself—who persuaded him to embark on a presidential
campaign, telling him that he needed to “do his duty,” (Harnden, 2011).
Historically, candidates who are widely known for reluctance may not be
hindered by it—in fact, they may be helped. To illustrate, Dwight Eisenhower was not
known for ambition, either publicly (New York Times, 1955) or privately (Galambos,
1989, p. 763). Of all of the U. S. Presidents since World War II, however, Eisenhower
has one of the highest approval ratings (Rasmussen, 2007), and virtually no Americans
believe him to be the worst U. S. President since World War II (Quinnipiac, 2006).
It is not out of the question to assume that this popularity and favorability is due
to the fact that Eisenhower was seen as an honorable war hero, and spent years avoiding
becoming involved in politics until Henry Cabot Lodge entered Eisenhower in the New
Hampshire Republican Presidential Primary in 1952—without Eisenhower’s permission
(Dykman, 2006), as Eisenhower declared to his friends that he did “not want” a political
5career (Galambos, 1989, p. 763, emphasis in original letter from Eisenhower).
Eisenhower only agreed to seek office out of a “summons to duty” for his country
(Galambos, 1989, p. 764), making him a perfect example of a real-life reluctant
candidate. He had such high levels of national support that he even came in second to
three-term governor and “favorite son” Harold Stassen in the 1952 Minnesota Republican
Presidential Primary despite not even being on the ballot due to notary error.  Eisenhower
finished with 108,692 write-in votes (38.7% of the vote) to the 129,076 of Stassen (46.0%
of the vote), whose name was on the ballot (Grant, 1979, p. 311)1.
As another example, Colin Powell was also urged to run for President or Vice
President—in 1996 and 2000 (Dickstein et al., 1994)—and decided against it, in spite of
high levels of approval and polling numbers (Voter News Service, 1996). Hibbing and
Alford (2004) make special note of Powell—along with Cincinnatus—as being the type
of candidate of whom people are fond; that is, if a reluctant decision-maker is preferred
by most people most of the time (p. 71n).
Expressing reluctance is seen by some politicos, however, as a tactic. Bill
Scranton, the Republican Governor of Pennsylvania during the early Sixties, was
1 However, it should be noted that scholars have since noted that Eisenhower took a very active and
constructive role in shaping his party and platform, in spite of a perceived aversion to partisan politics
(Cotter, 1983, p. 256). Of the Twentieth Century Presidents, Eisenhower was likely the President who
exercised the second-greatest—after Franklin Roosevelt—amount of power over his party and party
leadership (Greenstein, 1979). Although Americans may not be aware of this, the level of admiration of
Eisenhower today may or may not be reflective of his reluctance to seek office, or the actual amount of
constructive power he had within the Republican Party. Nevertheless, Eisenhower’s history and success as
a United States President offers an important insight into the idea of a reluctant candidate.
6pressured by many to run—including, oddly enough, Dwight Eisenhower (Bird, 1964, p.
73)—for the Republican nomination for President in 1964, but publicly expressed a
reluctance to do so (Time, 1964). Pennsylvania Democrats suspected this reluctance to be
a shrewd political tactic, and they accused him of playing “hard to get,” so to speak—as
he had when he ran for Congress and the Pennsylvania Governorship years before—in
order to attract powerful people to work on his campaign (Bird, 1964, p. 74). While the
“Draft Scranton” movement ultimately failed, the notion that Democrats would think that
Scranton’s expressions of reluctance were a political tactic is evidence that this is not a
new thought in American politics. This is especially true if future research reveals that, in
concert with WCT, most people prefer a candidate who is reluctant to seek office over a
politically ambitious candidate with high aspirations. Using an evolutionary lens to view
this specific set of political behaviors, then, could prove to be a useful tool (see Alford &
Hibbing, 2004, p. 718).
7METHODS
Research Design
This experiment uses the guise of a mock Congressional election to situate
participants within the aftermath of a primary election. Participants are shown newspaper
articles about one of two candidates with identical backgrounds and demographics. The
candidate, named Pat Wilson, is either a “recruitee” of party leaders, friends, and family
who reluctantly accepts a party’s nomination, or a markedly and hugely ambitious winner
of a five-candidate primary. In other words, participants will be in the “Reluctant
Candidate” or “Ambitious Candidate” condition, occasionally abbreviated as RC and AC
respectively.
Participants begin the experiment by logging into a survey website, asked basic
demographic information, and are shown one of two randomly selected articles. The
differences in the article are shown in Figure 1.
Participants are then asked for the likelihood that they will vote for the candidate,
their overall favorability of the candidate, and the degree to which a battery of character
descriptors apply to the candidate. These descriptors serve as manipulation checks, as the
battery includes terms such as “ambitious,” and “power hungry.” If participants do not
notice the ambition of the AC, for example, the validity of the results is in question.
Although, this research design allows for post-hoc participant analysis; that is, if
necessary, only the participants who are properly “manipulated” by the experiment—e.g.,
consider the term “ambitious” to describe the AC to a large degree—could be subject to
statistical analysis if necessary.
8Figure 1: Article Differences
Reluctant Candidate Ambitious Candidate
‘Reluctant’ Small Business Owner
Nominated for First Congressional
District Race
by JOE STEVENS
Small business owner Pat Wilson of Beatrice
has been nominated to run for the open
Congressional seat in the First District in a
primary that included Wilson and perennial
candidate Knute Overgaard. Wilson, 40,
received 99% of the vote.
A business owner and operator for fifteen
years, Wilson was repeatedly urged to run for
the open seat by family, friends, and
community leaders who, Wilson said,
“wouldn’t leave me alone.” Wilson
continued, “Congressmen were calling me—
everyone was saying I had to do this.”
Wilson said that the decision was ultimately
made by having it explained that this was
public service. “This is a good way to serve
my community.”
When Lincoln voters expressed
dissatisfaction with the current state of
American politics to Wilson on the streets of
Lincoln last week, Wilson responded,
“That’s why I don’t really want to run. The
system is broken.”
Wilson’s friends see that as the reason they
want their friend in Congress. One close
friend reported, “Pat is such a great person
and very humble. We need more people like
that in Washington.” When asked about
Wilson’s reluctance to seek office, they
laughed, stating, “I still don’t think that Pat
wants to be running, no. That’s probably a
good thing in this day and age, though.”
The First District is currently up for grabs
after the incumbent, Representative Jeff
Fortenberry, announced his retirement.
CQPolitics rates it as a “Toss-Up.”
‘Ambitious’ Small Business Owner
Nominated for First Congressional District
Race
by JOE STEVENS
After a long primary season with a crowded
field of candidates for an open Congressional
seat, small business owner Pat Wilson of
Beatrice was nominated to run for the First
Congressional District. Wilson, 40, won with
22% of the vote, narrowly beating out four
other candidates.
A business owner and operator for fifteen
years, Wilson admits to being very ambitious.
“I’d like to be President someday.” Wilson
continued, “But I’m happy to start in
Congress and work my way up from there.”
When Lincoln voters expressed dissatisfaction
with the current state of American politics to
Wilson on the streets of Lincoln last week,
Wilson responded, “That’s why I really want
to run. The system is broken.”
Wilson’s friends see that as the reason they
want their friend in Congress. One close
friend reported, “Pat is such a great person
and very ambitious. We need more people
like that in Washington.” When asked about
Wilson’s higher ambitions, they laughed,
stating, “Pat has wanted to be president for a
long time. That’s probably a good thing in this
day and age, though.”
The First District is currently up for grabs
after the incumbent, Representative Jeff
Fortenberry, announced his retirement.
CQPolitics rates it as a “Toss-Up.”
9Next, participants are given a forty-four statement Big Five personality battery
(John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991; John & Srivastava, 1999). The importance of individual
personality traits in political attitudes and behaviors cannot be understated. Each of the
Big Five traits—openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness,
and emotional stability, all of which are well-established in psychological literature (for a
review, see Saucier & Goldberg, 1998)—have been shown to correlate with either
political orientation or participation, or both (for a review, see Mondak, 2010).
Then, participants are asked for their party identification, political orientations,
and given a basic set of political knowledge questions. Whether asking people political
trivia questions—naming current office holders, in this experiment’s case—actually
reflects their political knowledge remains to be seen (for a review, see Brady, 2000);
however, participants’ knowledge of what is essentially political trivia could have an
impact on the degree to which they grasped a newspaper article about political news.
Prior to the final debrief page of the experiment, the final interactive section—issue
attitudes—is included for the same reason.
Hypotheses
H1: Most participants will prefer and have more positive feelings toward the reluctant
candidate as opposed to the ambitious candidate, indicated by higher vote likelihood
and overall favorability.
This is a direct application of WCT. As previously explained, in economic games,
people will be more willing to cooperate and put their trust in another player if the other
10
player does not appear to be power-seeking. Therefore, it should be expected that people
will be more willing to put their trust in a political representative who seems to be less
power-seeking, and they will do so by indicating a higher likelihood of voting for the RC
than the AC, and a higher favorability rating of the RC over the AC.
H2: The Big Five trait of Emotional Stability will mitigate these preference effects
such that subjects with low scores in Emotional Stability—that is, high scores in
Neuroticism—will prefer the ambitious candidate.
This would be expected due to what Neuroticism—the inverse of Emotional
Stability—is, by definition: A trait marked by emotional tenseness, nervousness, and
anxiety (McCrae & John, 1992). Research has shown that those who score high in
Neuroticism are poor self-managers and look to strong leadership in their everyday lives
(for a review, see Mondak, 2010, pp. 62-63).
Additionally, reluctance is, in itself, a trait of Neuroticism (Mondak, 2010, p. 62).
Those who score high in Neuroticism would not necessarily prefer or reject that trait in a
political representative. However, the other general characteristics of Neuroticism are
likely to drive, at the very least, unfavorable ratings of the RC by Neuroticism high-
scorers.
H3: The opposite will be true for those who score high in Agreeableness. They will
prefer and favor the reluctant candidate more than the ambitious candidate.
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This is also an extrapolation of the definition of the trait, in this case, of
Agreeableness. Those who score high in agreeableness prefer cooperation and
collaboration over competition and conflict (for a review, see Mondak, 2010, p. 61), and,
as a result, should prefer the candidate who ran virtually unopposed for the nomination,
as opposed to the candidate who was in a “crowded field” of candidates.
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RESULTS
The demographics of the sample were as expected for a population of college
students from a Midwestern university (Table 1) who were enrolled in an introductory
political science course in the fall of 2011, and were awarded class credit for their
participation. Republicans were slightly oversampled, but due to the fact that there are no
political stances included in the vignettes, this should not affect the results. Neither the
average age of 19.6 years nor gender showed any interaction with any variables in the
analysis.
First, H1 was shown to be incorrect, as there was no mean difference (Table 2).
An ANOVA reveals that there is no statistically significant mean difference between the
vote likelihood or the favorability of each candidate on the original seven-point scale, or
the reduced three-point scale2.
2 The seven-point scale was the scale that was originally on the survey, going from -3 to 3, strongly
unlikely or strongly unfavorable to the opposite. The three-point scale was a post-experiment variable
creation. -3, -2, and -1 became -1, 0 stayed 0, and 1, 2, and 3 became 1. This scale is used sparingly in this
paper and, when it is used, it is noted.
Total n 431
Females 201
Males 230
Republicans 227
Democrats 119
Independents 85
"Reluctant" Condition 220
"Ambitious" Condition 211
Table 1: Demographics
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The reasons behind this null result are difficult to discern. A check on the degree
to which subjects were manipulated reveals that the vignettes were successful in causing
subjects to associate their respective candidates with reluctance or power hunger—the
latter to a lesser-than-desired degree. But, there were also several other differences in the
amounts that subjects thought each of the words or phrases following the article
described their candidate (Table 3). Figure 2 illustrates these differences.
Though the mean difference was small, subjects rated the AC as, for example,
more of a “strong leader” than the RC, but the RC as more moral, honest, trustworthy,
and slightly more competent. A correlation analysis demonstrates that the “strong leader”
descriptor has the largest effect on association with both vote likelihood (R = .349, p <
.001) and favorability (R = .368, p < .001) of both candidates—although, separately,
“trustworthy” has a larger effect on evaluation of the AC, and the second-largest effect
for both conditions (Table 4).
Reluctant
Candidate
Ambitious
Candidate F p
Vote Likelihood 0.277 0.450 1.799 0.181
Favorability 0.800 0.848 0.178 0.673
Vote Likelihood 0.205 0.318 2.345 0.126
Favorability 0.505 0.564 0.797 0.373
Table 2: Overall Vote Likelihood and Favorability
7-Point Scale
3-Point Scale
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Reluctant Ambitious F**
Moral 3.582 3.043 31.226
Enthusiastic 1.945 4.194 674.618
Strong Leader 2.868 3.209 10.968
Ambitious 2.414 4.479 505.198
Knowledgeable 3.191 2.810 13.475
Power Hungry 1.336 2.550 140.748
Honest 4.191 3.223 115.027
Competent 3.355 3.038 10.479
Trustworthy 3.745 3.171 37.829
Narcissistic 1.541 1.976 22.258
Table 3: Average Descriptor Rating by Candidate
**p < .01
.001
.002
.003
.004
.005
Le
vel
 of
 Ag
ree
me
nt
Figure 2: Average Characteristic Rating
Reluctant
Ambitious
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As each of the descriptors are quite collinear with each other (for a full table, see
Appendix), the effect of one descriptor—“strong leader”—alone is worth analysis. Table
5 shows the mean levels of vote likelihood and favorability of both candidates together
and apart on the seven-point scale explained earlier.
VL Fav. VL Fav. VL Fav.
Moral .316 .312 .310 .295 .407 .380
Enthusiastic .253 .218 .340 .350 .306 .287
Strong Leader .349 .368 .398 .411 .261 .309
Ambitious .233 .218 .275 .326 .274 .253
Knowledgeable .277 .273 .283 .263 .314 .309
Power Hungry -.138 -.124 -.148* -.090‡ -.270 -.226
Honest .173 .213 .192 .180 .289 .345
Competent .272 .308 .230 .234 .380 .435
Trustworthy .303 .326 .296 .242 .406 .483
Narcissistic -.141 -.161 -.201 -.230 -.122‡-.113‡
‡ p > .05
Table 4: Descriptor Correlations
Both Reluctant Ambitious
All values are significant at a p < .01 level, unless: * p < .05
Not at all A Little ModeratelyWell
Quite a
Bit
Extremely
Well
Pearson's
R
Both -0.703** 0.155** 0.178** 0.836** 1.257** .349**
Reluctant -0.923 0.085 0.100 1.000 1.471 .398**
Ambitious -0.182 0.263 0.250 0.721 1.056 .261**
Both -0.270** 0.608** 0.740** 1.224** 1.600** .368**
Reluctant -0.346 0.678 0.657 0.657 1.941** .411**
Ambitious -0.091 0.500 0.816 0.816 1.278** .309**
Vote
Likelihood
Favorability
Table 5: "Strong Leader" Agreement Means and Corresponding Attitudes
**p < .001
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Figure 3 and Figure 4 illustrate this interaction. A positive relationship is
evident, with, as shown in Table 5 and discussed earlier, relatively strong linear
relationships between vote likelihood and the degree to which participants described their
candidate as a “strong leader.” The differences between the effect sizes of “strong leader”
on candidate evaluation (.398 vs. .261 and .411 vs. .309) are not statistically significant
(Fisher’s Z = 1.588 and 1.210 on RC and AC respectively; both values are less than the
critical Z of 1.96).
0
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Not at all A Little Moderately
Well
Quite a Bit Extremely
Well
Figure 3: "Strong Leader" Agreement and
Vote Likelihood
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Not at all A Little Moderately
Well
Quite a Bit Extremely
Well
Figure 4: "Strong Leader" Agreement and
Favorability
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Using the participants’ responses to the battery of descriptors, it is possible and
necessary to more closely examine the impact that the perceived characteristics of the
candidates have on vote likelihood and favorability. By selecting only the cases that
exhibited the largest degree of desired manipulation, the ability to better examine whether
perceived ambition or power hunger versus reluctance and a lack of ambition affects
candidate evaluation.
I will proceed through the use of two methods of data selection. The first
method—henceforth referred to as “Method 1”—will select only the participants who
reported that “Ambitious” described the AC “Quite a bit” or “Extremely well,” as
opposed to “Moderately well,” “A little,” or “Not at all.” In addition, only the participants
who reported that “Ambitious” described the RC “Not at all,” or “A little,” will be
included.
First, as shown in Figure 5, the manipulation worked for a large percentage of the
participants, and the AC was seen as significantly more ambitious than the RC
(F(1,430)=505.20, p < . 001). However, a noticeable percentage of participants did not
fall into the first method’s selection—for the RC, nearly 46% of participants thought
“ambitious” described their candidate “Moderately well,” “Quite a bit,” or “Extremely
well,” while for the AC, 10.5% thought “ambitious” described their candidate “A little,”
or “Not at all.”
18
The reason to only select a sample, in this case, is clear—a large percentage of
participants were not properly manipulated. When the Method 1 sample is analyzed, the
overall results shift (Table 6). For participants who perceive the experimentally desired
levels of ambition, the AC is significantly more favored than the RC in both candidate
evaluation metrics. A power analysis should be conducted, however. For vote likelihood,
there is almost exactly 80% power, barely meeting the threshold for significance (R =
.20). For favorability, however, there is less than 80% power, meaning that the sample
lacks enough power to dismiss the risk of a Type I error.
.00
10.00
20.00
30.00
40.00
50.00
60.00
70.00
80.00
90.00
100.00
Not at all A little Moderately
well
Quite a bit Extremely
well
Figure 5: Percentage of Each Condition's Response to
"Ambitious
Reluctant %
Ambitious %
Reluctant Ambitious F
Vote Likelihood 2.992 3.545 13.421**
Favorability 3.479 3.921 10.389**
**p < .01
Candidate
Table 6: Method 1 Sample
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For Method 2, I will explore the “power hungry” descriptor in the same fashion.
Figure 6 shows the percentage of participants who selected each descriptor agreement.
For the manipulation to have worked completely, no participants in the RC condition
should have selected anything but “Not at all.” Only the 81% of RC participants will be
selected in this analysis. For the AC condition, properly manipulated subjects were
expected to perceive at least “Quite a bit” of power hunger; therefore, only the top two
levels—23.6% of the condition participants—will be selected. Although this selection
method cuts down the total sample to 52.9% of its original size, it is necessary, if only for
comparison purposes—that is, what one can surmise may have happened had the
experimental design properly manipulated experiment participants.
The results show no statistically significant mean difference between either
candidate evaluation metric (Table 7). However, due to the small sample size of this
selection method, the null result could be a factor of not enough statistical power—as
.0
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Not at all A little Moderately
well
Quite a bit Extremely
well
Figure 6: Percentage of Each Condition's Response to
"Power Hungry"
Reluctant %
Ambitious %
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previously mentioned—only slightly more than half of participants were selected for
Method 2.
Nevertheless, even for the subjects on whom the manipulation worked, the
perception of a candidate having a hunger for power makes no difference for vote choice.
Power Hunger
However, a simple bivariate correlation changes the picture. As the perception of
power hunger increases for the AC, vote likelihood and favorability decrease
significantly (see Table 4)—“Power Hunger” agreement has a significant, medium-sized,
negative correlation with vote likelihood and favorability (R= -.270 and -.226
respectively). As the notion of “power hunger” is central to the purpose of this
experiment, this is likely the most important finding of the study.
Moreover, as shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8, the overall effect of power hunger
on vote choice and favorability for the AC is noticeable, and an ANOVA F-test reveals
these overall mean differences to be significant for both vote choice (F (4,206) = 4.912, p
< .01) and favorability (F (4,206) = 5.428, p < .001) of the AC.
Reluctant Ambitious F
Vote Likelihood 3.332 3.080 1.127
Favorability 3.820 3.560 1.469
Table 7: Method 2 Sample
Candidate
For each F-test, p > . 05
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The Big Five
To test H2, attention will be turned to any effect that Emotional
Stability/Neuroticism had on candidate evaluation. Although, it should first be noted that
correlations between the Big Five traits and self-reported ideology were consistent with
previous research (see Appendix).
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Figure 7: "Power Hungry" Agreement and Mean Vote
Likelihood for AC
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Figure 8: "Power Hungry" Agreement and Mean
Favorability for AC
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Neuroticism had no significant role in evaluation of the AC, but it had a small role
in evaluation of the RC (Table 8). The higher the participant’s Neuroticism score, the
less favorable of a rating they gave to the RC.
Additionally, when the sample is divided into three Neuroticism groups—the
middle fiftieth percentile, and the upper and lower twenty-fifth percentiles—H2 is
partially supported. Although this division results in a null result in terms of mean vote
likelihood differences—as it does in the bivariate correlation analysis shown in Table
8—candidate favorability is also shown to be affected (Figure 9). Those who score the
lowest in Neuroticism indicate significantly greater favorability of the RC than those in
the medium- and highest-scoring groups (F (2,217) = 4.134, p < .05). Although, as is
immediately apparent when inspecting Table 8 and Figure 9, the overall effects of
Neuroticism on candidate evaluation are significant, but minimal.
The same is true for Agreeableness. The effect sizes remain quite small, but
significant, for both candidate favorability and vote likelihood. Using the same group
breakdown as in the Neuroticism analysis, the only statistically significant mean
difference is for vote likelihood on a three-point scale (F (2,217) = 3.691, p < .05). The
effect size (R = .181) has more than 80% statistical power. Figure 10 shows the mean
differences. Those who score low in Agreeableness have a significantly lower mean
likelihood of voting for the RC than the medium- and high-scoring groups, which are
essentially identical in their mean ratings.
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Trait
Vote
Likelihood Favorability
Agreeableness .156* .175**
Conscientiousness 0.094 .095
Neuroticism -.125 -.187**
Openness -.063 .061
Extraversion .077 .076
Agreeableness .140* .204**
Conscientiousness .059 .095
Neuroticism -.091 -.198**
Openness -.078 .086
Extraversion .062 .076
* p < .05
** p < .01
3-Point Scale
7-Point Scale
Table 8: Big Five Correlations
Reluctant Candidate
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DISCUSSION
Central Results
The manipulation check revealed that the central conceit of the experiment
worked for a majority of participants, but there was still a null result in terms of mean
vote likelihoods and favorability ratings of the respective candidates. Even for the
subjects on whom the manipulations were especially successful—using Methods 1 and 2
of participant selection—there was either no mean difference between the candidate
evaluations. In the case of Method 1, in one instance, the opposite of H1 was observed—
although this effect was small and barely statistically powerful enough to warrant
discussion.
Method Comparison
Of the two post-hoc participant selection methods, Method 1 resulted in a
statistically significant mean difference that was contrary to the hypothesized result. In
other words, for study participants who either described the RC as “Not at all” or “A
little” ambitious, or the AC as “Quite a bit” to “Extremely” ambitious, the AC was rated
with a significantly higher vote likelihood.
I can only speculate as to why this is the case, but there appears to be one primary
reason: Participants linked “ambitious” and “strong leader” together very strongly.
Interestingly, participants’ ratings of the RC’s ambition and leadership were statistically
much more strongly correlated than participants’ ratings of the AC’s ambition and
leadership (.549 vs. .228, Fisher’s Z = 3.966, which is greater than the critical value of
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2.33 for p < .01). The small number of participants who gave a highly ambitious rating to
the RC, however, renders the power of this test insignificant.
Nevertheless, it is most likely that it was not ambition that affected vote
likelihood, but rather the perception of the ability to possess strong leadership. The
correlation between vote likelihood of the entire sample and “strong leader” is
significantly larger than “ambitious.” The difference between the mean agreement with
the descriptor of “strong leader” for either candidate was significant and statistically
powerful—although the effect size was small (F (1,429) = 10.968, R = .158).
Moreover, the perception of power hunger—absolutely central to this
experiment—was a significant factor in vote likelihood and candidate favorability for the
AC. The more “power hungry” that participants thought the AC was, the less favorable
their attitudes toward them, and the less likely the participants were to vote for them. This
is the largest confirmation of WCT of the experiment. Participants were, indeed, wary to
support a candidate they perceived to be power hungry.
Big Five and Candidate Evaluations
Two of the Big Five—Agreeableness and Neuroticism—had a small, yet
important role in attitude formation related to the candidates. The mere fact that they
were shown to associate with basic candidate evaluation is an important result. While
previous research has dealt with the personality and the way people make political
decisions (Mondak, 2010), the political decisions made—or not made—by this study’s
participants suggest a willingness to favor or oppose a political candidate based only on
the fact that a candidate expressed reluctance to run for office.
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Implications for Wary Cooperator Theory
The Wary Cooperator Theory, then, is not wholly applicable to candidate
evaluation in a mock Congressional campaign, although it is not dismissed, either. To
illustrate, ambition is not as immediately relevant to WCT as power hunger is, and the
absolutely more power hungry candidate was not preferred.
The purpose was to deceive participants into believing that this was a real
situation. In order to do that, realistic candidates needed to be presented. Though it may
have better served the overarching purpose of this experiment to have a more openly
power-hungry candidate, it would have defeated the realism—very few candidates in
modern American politics are open about a burning desire for great power.
However, the reluctant version of the candidate served their purpose well. As
discussed in the literature review, an open reluctance—whether legitimate or feigned—to
seek power or hold office is nothing new in American politics.
Limitations
There are certainly issues with using undergraduate students enrolled in
introductory political science courses as an experimental subject pool (for a review, see
Druckman & Kam, 2011). An ideal participant sample would be nationally representative
sample of Americans—or, if the study was about differences in geography on candidate
evaluation, then representative city samples—and not limited to undergraduate students.
With undergraduates, researchers run the risk of not properly representing a wider
sample—that is, external validity is sacrificed for convenience (Henrich, Heine, &
Norenzayan, 2010).
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External validity is also in-question as a result of the fact that participants took the
survey in a non-lab setting—which is typically injurious to external validity. However,
this was dealt with by taking into account the time it took participants to finish the survey
and removing those who rushed through it; those who finished the survey in less time
than 95% of the rest of the participants—completing the survey in less than four minutes
when the average time it took participants to finish was around twenty minutes—were
removed from analysis.
Additionally, participants were reminded on each section of the survey they
would receive credit for taking the survey regardless of how they answered the questions,
and were encouraged to take as much time as they needed, and pay close attention to the
questions being asked. The final prompt of the survey was “I have been paying close
attention for the entirety of this survey,” and participants overwhelmingly chose
“Strongly Agree.” Those who did not choose “Strongly Agree” or “Agree” (n=15) were
not included in the final analysis. Coincidently, the participants who were eliminated as a
result of that question were almost entirely made up of the same participants who were
also eliminated as a result of not taking enough time.
Nevertheless, I make no claims about the overall generalizability of this
experiment to a larger population. The results are completely internally valid, but any
attempts to generalize the results to the rest of America are ill-advised.
Recommendations for Future Research
If the candidates were given partisan identification, or any sort of political
platform, the effect of the candidates’ politics on subjects’ evaluations of the candidates
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would be a topic of study. If most Americans are moderates as many scholars would
argue (Fiorina, 2005)—although others reject this claim (Abramowitz & Saunders,
2005)—then the more extreme a candidate’s views are, the less likely they should be
supported. Meanwhile, conservatives’ general preferences for strong leadership and
authoritarian hierarchies in governance would almost certainly play a role (for a review,
see Jost et al., 2003). But, the impact that a candidate’s reluctance to seek office has on
voters’ evaluations of the candidate may mitigate any effects of the candidate’s political
stances, as a result of the inherent differences between different political ideologies.
The degree to which a participant’s partisan identification or political orientation
affects their support of a candidate of their own party or orientation, or opposition to a
candidate of another party or orientation is an interesting question. The effect that
personality would have on such a design would also be a fascinating subject for future
research. Future iterations of this study could include designs like that outlined in the
paragraph above, in which one of each candidate is shown to participants, and they are
asked to choose between the two.
Moreover, as political science continues to incorporate natural science methods
into its metrics (e.g. Alford, Funk, & Hibbing, 2005; Fowler, Baker, & Dawes, 2008;
McDermott, 2011; Schreiber, 2011; Smith & Hibbing, 2011), one possible step forward
in this area could be to measure—as Oxley et al. (2008) do—physiological response to
threat, and how it may affect one’s favorability of either candidate. This would be
especially important in a design in which two candidates are presented to participants,
and participants are asked to choose one or the other.
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CONCLUSION
The better we understand the processes by which voters make political decisions,
the better we can understand the effectiveness and progress of the American political
system. Although a candidate’s expression of either higher political ambitions or deep
political reluctance plays no overall role in the way the participants in this study
evaluated their respective candidates, the experiment did reveal participants’ ostensible
distrust and negative feelings toward what they perceived to be power hunger, as shown
in Figure 7 and Figure 8. While these results may be used by political campaigns to
portray their candidates as less power-hungry and more reluctant and dutiful, the results
may also be used by the electorate—more aware that a campaign’s portrayal of a
candidate as reluctant could hypothetically be a reflection of the opposite trait, more
aware that this is another method through which campaigns could take advantage of
them, and more aware that a way forward for the American experiment is a fuller, wider,
and greater cognizance of those two concepts.
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Big Five and Ideology
Social Econ.
Agreeableness -.064 -.083
Conscientiousness .160** .163**
Neuroticism -.143** -.139**
Openness -.188** -.106*
Extraversion -.001 .013
Ideology
Conservatism has the higher code * p < .05
Big Five and Ideology
** p < .01
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